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cured in exchange for fifty destroyers and if these bases had been 
immediately fortified for the protection of the country. Perhaps it 
would also have been better if he had demanded the bases in the 
lVIarshall Islands which were later turned over to Japan and which 
have now been used to attack us. Renunciation of selfish, imperial-
istic aims involving the conquest and subjugation of alien people is 
not necessarily irreconcilable with a desire to secure definite advan-
tages for one's country. 
Fourth, they must not promise the impossible. Otherwise post-
war disillusionment will be accentuated. 
Fifth, war aims must undermine enemy morale. 
Sixth, war aims must bind the allies together. 
Some of these aims are hard to reconcile. Merely to enumerate 
them indicates the difficult problem which an administration faces 
-the problem of setting forth war aims which will at the same time 
stiffen popular morale for the war period and provide a sound and 
workable program for a difficult and very different post war period. 
If the government is to maintain a high morale, there is no bet-
ter injunction than to quote the words of President Lincoln in ap-
pointing General Hooker to the command of the Army of the Poto-
mac, "God forward and give us victories." But the people must 
stand firm while victory is being prepared. That must involve a 
program of useful work for everyone. Only as everyone is personally 
a participant in useful work that contributes to victory will every-
one also feel the buoyant enthusiasm and confidence that is the 
essence of sound morale. 
MEASURING NATIONAL MORALE 
F. STUART CH,APIN 
University of Minnesota 
lVIorale has come to be a factor of prime importance in organiza-
tion for a total war. Time was when the civilian population re-
mained an inactive mass in war time, since professional soldiers 
alone conducted the fighting. Now the entire civilian population is 
harnessed to the war effort. The fighting forces are selected from 
the population by conscription, industrial workers are assigned to 
definite tasks in the production of military equipment and supplies, 
volunteers-women as well as men-are recruited for a variety of 
civilian defense services, prices and wages are subject to govern-
ment regulation, savings of surplus income are channelized into the 
purchase of war bonds, and income taxes reach down to the lower 
levels of earning. But all this regimentation of individual behavior 
is accompanied in a democracy with the necessity of keeping a 
highly literate people informed about the goals of the war effort and 
the current events that mark off steps toward achieving the goals. , 
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MORALE is defined as the degree to which the individual feels 
competent to cope with the future and achieve his desired goals.1 
Feeling about one's capacity to achieve desired goals at some future 
time, is usually expressed in opinions exchanged in conversation and 
in discussion. National morale is then expressed in the opinions that 
people state consistently, that is, those opinions they voice and then 
reiterate without much variation, about the means they favor to 
attain the goals they desire. When their behavior in voting, in con-
tributing money to support, and in personal sacrifice to attain the 
end, is also consistent with their opinions, we conclude that we are 
seeing evidence of good morale. Thus a complete measure of na-
tional morale would require both a measure of public opinion and a 
measure of public behavior. 
Although several psychometric scales have been developed to 
measure morale, none of them has been tried out upon a represen-
tative sample of the population of the United States. Consequently, 
no scientific statements can be made about national morale. All that· 
can be stated are certain qualified inferences about morale from the 
Gallup Polls and certaii1 very limited conclusions about small 
groups of people who responded to the scaled tests of morale. Even 
less is known about the consistency of behavior with these expressed 
opinions, and no systematic procedure like the Gallup Poll has been 
devised to measure national behavior. In spite of these limitations 
in our knowledge everyone talks about morale as if it were an easily 
observable phenomenon and I have been asked to prepare this pa-
per on measuring national morale. 
Since the measurement of national morale would require testing 
a representative sample of the population of the United States on 
one or more of the recently constructed scales designed to measure 
national morale, and as I have just indicated, we have as yet no 
such. data, I shall confine my treatment of this subject first, to 
some of the more technical problems of measuring morale, and sec-
ond, a consideration of some observations on factors relevant to na-
tional morale, and finally on examination of the Gallup Polls of 
public opinion. 
John Harding published "A Scale for Measuring Civilian Mor-
ale" in 1941.2 Inasmuch as his definition is definitely relat~d to some 
points that we shall presently consider, his definition may be quoted 
in full. "Given a certain task to be accomplished by a group, morale 
pertains to all factors in the individual's life- that bring about a 
hopeful and energetic participation on his part so that his efforts 
enhance the effectiveness of the group in accomplishing the task in 
hand." With this statement as a start, he then constructed a ques-
tionnaire of 48 items which was administered to 311 Harvard jun-
iors. Intercorrelations among the items revealed several empiric•a1 
clusters. The questionnaire was then revised and enlarged to 59 
1 Rundquist, E. A., & Sletto, R. R., Persondit11 in t!ie Depression, 1936. 
2 The Journal of Psychology, 1941, 12: 101-110. 
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items and administered to two criterion groups selected to repre-
sent high and low morale respectively. The high morale group con-
sisted of 44 distinguished social scientists and men in public life, 
each of whom was devoting a considerable part of his time to the 
furthei·ance of national morale. The low morale group consisted of 
14 subjects from a settlement house group, described as "surly" or 
"having a grudge against the world," and 32 additional men ap-
proached while loafing during working hours on the Boston Com-
mon. 
The final form of the morale scale consisted of 20 items chosen 
by the two procedures just described. Eight items seemed to form 
a cluster expressing an attitude of confidence. Five items formed a 
cluster around an attitude of tolerance. Four items referred to an 
attitude of realism as opposed to wishful thinking; and three items 
expressed an attitude of assertive idealism in international affairs. 
Each of the questions was scored on a five-point scale so that the 
possible range was from 20 to 100 points. 
The lower morale group exhibited great heterogeneity of atti-
tudes but the high morale group was by no means an optimistic 
group. 
The second morale scale recently published is that of Delbert C. 
Miller, the "Washington State Survey of Opinions" a scale to meas-
ure national morale.3 The author began his study with five hypo-
theses to supply a theory of national morale which could be tested. 
These hypotheses are: (1) belief in the superiority of the social 
structure of the in-group; (2) degree and manner by which personal 
goals are identified with national goals; (3) judgments of the com-
petence of national leadership; (4) belief that resources are available 
to hurl back any threats to the in-group; and (5) confidence in the 
permanence of national goals. To test these hypotheses, 48 opinion 
statements were prepared with a five point scale. A preliminary test 
was made on 200 undergraduates in freshman, sophomore, junior 
and senior classes in proportions representative of the student body 
at ·washington State College. Item analysis was then made against 
the total score as a criterion and a scale of 18 significant items oh-
tained. By this method of analysis it was found that the most sig-
nificant of the five hypotheses were in order (2), (1), and (5). The 
other two hypotheses were also related to the criterion, but not as 
significantly. · 
What are the conclusions that can be made from this brief de-
scription of the Harding and the Miller scales? I think that the first 
conclusion is that the Harding scale shows a definite relationship 
between participation, action, and the expenditure of effort, on the 
one hand, and attitudes of confidence, tolerance, realism and ideal-
ism (all components of morale) on the other hand. These results 
""The :Measurement ol' Kalionnl :Morale"', American Sociological Review, G: 4: 
487-498, August, 1941. 
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thus seem to confirm the validity of the original definition of morale 
as formulated by Ru_ndquist and Sletto in 1936. From the Miller 
scale one may conclude that national morale consists first in the 
degree and manner by which personal goals are identified with na-
tional goal.s, second, in the belief in the superiority of the social 
structure of the in-group, and third, in confidence in the perma-
nence of national goals. The net conclusion is that morale goes along 
with belief in national goals and is strengthened by active partici-
pation in efforts to achieve these goals. These conclusions are not 
measures of national morale, but rather a clarification of the fun-
damental factors in morale. 
Let us now examine some aspects of the present American scene 
which are related to morale. The public is confused about the va-
lidity of its goals when its leaders do not keep it informed. As a 
people we are unused to censorship and resent any restrictions on 
freedom of discussion. The claims and counter-claims of blocs and 
special interest groups tend to becloud the real issues of making 
prompt decisions upon the best means to win the war. When farm-
ers, organized labor and businessmen all stand out to maintain 
prices and wages, the special pleadings they voice, tend to obscure 
the national g·oal. We are also unfamiliar with the horrors of secret 
police, -atrocities and cruelty to conquered civilian peoples. Con-
sequently, we can not bring ourselves to a realization that these 
things exist in the same world with the four freedoms we prize so 
highly. The essential decency of American attitudes makes us 
skeptical of the reality of these horrors. Furthermore, these stark 
and grim realities have occurred against a background of debunk-
ing of the national heroes of American history. Our frame of refer-
ence has been warped by the tendency of certain intellectuals to 
deprecate the simpler virtues of past leaders and to subject them to 
ridicule because they failed in all respects to live up to a wholly 
unrealistic perfectionism of character. 
War censorship in a context of propaganda means that the usual 
safeguards of counter-propaganda ate removed by centralization of 
news at the source so that government propaganda is more strictly 
channelized than occurs in a peaceful democratic society. Conse-
quently morale may suffer from uncertainty as to the real facts of 
any particular case. While at the moment there seems little evidence 
to support the belief that freedom of the press will be unduly re-
stricted, it is well to ask the question, how can ,ve protect ourselves 
from the more insidious forms of propaganda? While no fool-proof 
rules can be formulated, there are in general three questions that 
can be asked about a statement. If the answers are No! then there 
is a strong probability that the statement contains undesirable 
propaganda. Does the statement present all sides of the issue? Note 
that we do not ask whether both sides are presented, because to 
ask the question that way presupposes that there are only two sides, 
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probably a good side and a bad side. In our complex world there 
are usually several alternatives. Is the reader free to draw his own 
inference from the evidence, or is the statement so worded as to 
force a particular conclusion? Is there freedom of inquiry into the 
sources of the evidence upon which the statement rests? Strains up-
on institutional structure due to the alienation of popular support 
will be diminished and confidence restored in some measure by us-
ing these correctives to propaganda. 
In our democratic social order we value our four freedoms very 
highly. Freedom of assemblage, freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press and freedom of religious worship, may experience some re-
striction in war time when national survival is at stake. This is 
necessary and will be accepted. Judging from the experience of 
Great Britain, where the strain on social institutions has been much 
more severe than anything yet experienced in America, it seems cer-
tain that we can maintain our essential freedoms even in organiza-
tion for total war. But, one asks, are there not specific safeguards 
that can be taken to-protect freedom of assemblage and freedom of 
speech, safeguards consistent with tighter controls and yet per-
mitting the needed expression of minority views? Years ago Ed-
ward A .. Ross, in his Social Psychology, 1908, enumerated certain 
principles of prophylaxis against mob mind. J\fore recently Everett 
Dean 1\!Iartin in his Behavior of Crowds, 1920, sketched out some of 
the mechanisms operating when an audience becomes a crowd and 
verges upon the psychology of the mob. These analyses are familiar 
to aHsocial psychologists and are excellent general accounts. What 
we have needed is a practical guide. This we now have in a publi-
cation of the Council for Democracy, 11 West 42nd St., New York 
City, printed in 1941, of a list of nine points that may be regarded 
as practical safeguards which maintain freedom of speech in war 
time and also may prevent mob psychology from developing. First, 
select a meeting place larger than the expected audience. Second, 
microphones must be used. Third, provide adequate lighting of the 
hall. Forth, have a low platform, with a table and chairs. Fifth, 
parliamentary law must be observed and no mass chants allowed. 
Sixth, permit no uniforms or insignia or banners on the part of 
civilians. Seventh, provide friendly police. Eighth, bond those re-
sponsible for the meeting. And ninth, make similar provisions for 
overflmv audiences, protest groups or other minorities. 
Civilian morale is a function of the degree to which the people 
are free to participate in the support of the national effort. When a 
community finds opportunity to channelize its efforts toward the 
achievement -of winning the war there is a lift in morale. This has 
been true in Minneapolis. The emergency organization of the com-
munity of the City of Minneapolis to meet the shock of war needs 
began a year ago when members of the Board of Directors of the 
Council of Social Agencies began to consider seriously the effect of 
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numerous war relief fund campaigns upon the ability of the com-
munity to support its regular civic agencies.4 There were commu-
nity conflicts inherent in the situation when financial support to 
voluntary war relief drives jeopardized the financial support of the 
regular agencies of welfare·. Unless resolved by careful community 
planning, these uncoordinated activities would waste funds and con-
fuse the issues. Furthermore, the development of· a competitive 
spirit in an area where cooperation was greatly needed would initi-
ate independently organized activities and channelize energies into 
interests with narrow outlook and purpose. Eventually we would 
find ourselves in a situation that would entail unplanned conse-
quences of independently planned social actions. 5 
The first step was to organize a War Chest which would provide 
a common single fund raising campaign for all the war relief agen-
cies but with continued support also to the regular social work 
agencies. Since the Community fund raises $1,300,000 annually for 
the support of 54 social agencies of the city, and through its Coun-
cil of Social Agencies, provides the c_oordinated planning for over 
50 additional private and public agencies with other means of sup-
port,' the problem was a major issue however considered. By the late 
summer of 1941 this War Chest organization was completely out-
lined, although it was January 1942 before it began to function. The 
danger of competition between volunteer war fund financing and 
money raising for ordinary civilian welfare agencies was, however,· 
only one point of potential conflict. There were three other threats 
to coordinated community planning in the interest of reducing in-
stitutional strains and in working for institutional adjustments. One 
of these was the war-time prerogatives of the American Red Cross 
as a semi-official agency of government, another was the movement 
to organize Civilian Defense Councils, and a third was the pressure 
of eager citizens and women's organizations to play their part in 
defense. One by one these potential threats to community organiza-
tion were met and solved. 
The Minneapolis Civilian Defense Council was established by 
City Ordinance in February 1942, and divisions on utilities, civil 
protection, military services, industrial resources, labor, health, wel-
fare and community services, were created. Now it happened that 
the Minneapolis Council of Social Agencies alr~ady operated its 
technical planning functions through a Central Planning and Re-
search Committee, which is subdivided into areas of health, group 
work and recreation, and case work and relief. This central plan-
ning and research unit was immediately integrated as a technical 
service unit with the corresponding divisions of the Civilian De-
• An excellent account of the same matrix of factors in 1917-1918, is described in 
Anderson and Ryan's monograph, "'Var Came to the Iowa Community", Iowa Agri. 
Experiment Station, Bulletin p. 36, January, 1942. · 
0 See my analysis of unplanned consequences of independently planned social 
actions in "Social Theory and Social Action", Amer. Soc.· Rev. Vol. 1, No. 1, Feb., 
1926, p.11. 
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fense Council. The method used was to name the vice-chairman of 
the group work and recreation unit of the Central Planning Commit-
tee the chairman of the corresponding section of the CDC; _to name 
the vice-chairman of the health unit of the central planning Com-
mittee, the chairman of the corresponding health section of the 
CDC; and to name the vice-chairman of the welfare unit of the 
Central Planning Committee, the chairman of the corresponding 
section of the CDC. The technical secretaries of these subdivisions 
of the Central Planning Committee served also ~s the technical sec-
retaries of corresponding sections of the CDC. Many conferences 
were of course necessary to affect this coordination of effort, but the 
point is that the arrangements were worked out in this manner and 
consequently no serious problems have arisen. Having solved this 
problem created by the threat of overlapping jurisdictions between 
the CDC and the Central Council of Social Agencies, there re-
mained the problem of articulating these combined organizations 
with the American Reel Cross. This problem also was worked out 
so that no friction or duplication of function resulted. In this case 
the arrangement was to make the Disaster Relief Committee of the 
American Red Cross one and the same in authority, organization 
and personnel with the Evacuation and Relief Unit of the Civilian 
Defense Corps. Since the Civilian Defense Corps was organized as 
the "combat division" of the CDC to function in times of public 
emergency such as air-raids, munition plant explosions, large fires, 
floods or other major disasters, the lines of authority were easily 
set to run up through the fire department, to the police department 
and to the military unit." Finally, what should be clone about the 
hundreds of civic clubs and women's organizations equally eager to 
aid in organized defense work? Here again the principle of central 
coordination under the CDC was worked out. A special activities sec-
tion of the CDC was set up to include recreation, eonsi.1mers inter-
ests, women's activities, welfare and health, each coordinated by 
interlocking personnel and stipulated lines of authority with the 
other divisions of the CDC and with the Civilian Defense Corps. 
The leaders of this vast effort at community planning and co-
ordination are convinced that civilian morale may be maintained 
and built up to support the total war effort by giving people an 
opportunity to do their share in a common organized effort. The 
objectives are definite, the procedures of action in time of emer-
gency are worked out in systematic detail, and everyone who par-
ticipates has a definite task to perform in the effort to attain this 
objective. Considering the number of munition plants in :Minne-,_ 
apolis, its strategic importance in the great flour industry, and its 
hinterland which contains the chief source of iron ore, a public 
emergency is not so remote a contingency as it might seem on first 
thought. A plan of action ready to follow sustains morale. 
0 A special issue of Minne,Yota l\1unicipalitie.Y, on civilian defense, March, l!l4"l, 
supplies a detailed outline of the legal foundations. 
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Morale has been defined' as the degree to which an individual 
feels competent to cope with the future and to achieve his· desired 
goals. In the present situation we have as the first common goal, 
superordinate to all previous individual goals, to win the war. In 
primitive societies the actions of individuals flow readily over from 
stimulus to responding behavior. Thus the stimulus of attack, 
arousing bodily preparation in muscular tension, deepened respira-
tion, increased ·heart rate, and the pouring into the blood stream of 
adrenalin from the glands and of sugar from the liver, is followed by 
fighting behavior, ·or flight and hiding as the case may be. In the 
present situation, however, such forceful stimuli as atrocity stories, 
cruelty to civilian refugees, or fear _of inflation, are complex experi-
ences which usually occur in combination. Our original nature re-
sponds to these by the usual bodily preparation to fight or flee and 
we experience an increased heart rate, deepened respiration, muscu-
lar tension, and an increase in adrenalin and blood sugar. But what 
type of individual responding behavior can lead to victory or se-
curity? We can not as isolated individuals do anything quick and 
satisfying about atrocities, the torture of civilians, or menacing in-
flation. Any simple and satisfactory response is frustrated. The only 
possible successful response is an institutional response. That is to 
say we can win the war, protect helpless and enslaved peoples, 
check inflation, only by discharging our energies over a slow-mov-
. ing network of institutional pattei-ns. :MacArthur was ordered to 
leave the Philippines on February 22nd, but it was not until March 
17, 1942, that the news of the .MacArthur's arrival in Australia was 
announced, twenty-three days later! Censorship was necessary to 
keep secret from the Japanese the very idea that the commander of 
an invested army could be removed, and then military preparations 
had to be made to continue the defense of Batan, as well as to work 
out the secret arrangements of flight and transportation. :Mean-
while, people wondered and worried over what seemed to be a lost 
opportunity to place a great military commander in a larger field of 
service where he might turn the scales toward victory. In other 
words, the. people felt frustrated and their morale suffered. 
Now it is perhaps evident from this brief illustration following 
upon our description of the civilian defense organization in :Minne-
apolis, that the orientation of community institutions toward de-
fense may be accomplished by a well coordinated plan. This sup-
plies the institutional machinery over which the aroused impulses 
of the people toward effective action may be usefully discharged, 
thereby giving each individual according to his capacities, an op-
portunity to contribute his personal effort to achieve the common-
desired goal. This definite relationship to the pattern of collective 
effort gins him a feeling of competence to achieve his goal and dis-
solves any feeling of frustration. As a result civilian morale is stif-
fened. The moral about morale is, therefore, to do something. 
7 Hun<lquist. E. A., & Sletto, R. R., Personctlit11 i11 the Depression, 1936. 
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Evidence of the desires of civilians to participate in the defense 
effort has been continually expressed in the Gallup public opinion 
polls. On November 9, 1941, with only 9 per cent undecided, some 
67 per cent favored the J.lropositions that in time. of war the gov-
ernment should have the right to tell factory owners and business-
men what products they can make and what prices they can charge. 
With 9 per cent undecided, Gl per cent favored regulation of farm 
production and farm prices. It seems particularly significant that 
unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled workers and white collar workers ap-
proved by 64 per cent (7 per cent undecided) economic controls over 
themselves, and 81 per cent of businessmen ( 4 per cent undecided) 
would accept government dictation over factory products and 
prices. By J\IIarch 1942, Gl per cent favored total mobilization of all 
citizens and 7 per cent were undecided. A seventy-two per cent vote 
in August 1940· favoring a law to forbid strikes in war industries, 
changed to 86 per cent in favor of such regulation in :March 1942, 
with only 5 per cent undecided. . 
Reliance upon the results of Gallup Polls a·s indicators of morale 
assumes first that inferences from these results may be justified on 
logical grounds, and second, that the responses to the polls are valid 
and reliable indicators of what public opinion really is. Taking first 
the question of logical inference, we may say that if expressed opin-
ions are consistent with future action, that then the advanced ex-
pression of opinion may be taken as an indicator of probable future 
action. In the examples given, we do not yet have evidence of subse-
quent action, in terms of accepting economic controls over wages 
and prices, and conformity to regulations that control wages and 
prices, because the complete system of governmental control has not 
yet been worked out, legalized or put into effect. All that can be 
said on this point, therefore, is to cite evidence of earlier polls of 
public opinion that was followed by voting behavior consistent 
therewith. On the basis of the rather satisfactory vote predicting re-
sults of earlier Gallup Polls. we would seem to be justified in the 
expectation that the polls which show willingness to accept govern-
mental regulations that contribute to winning the war, will be fol-
lowed by conformity to these regulations when they arc legalized 
and enforced. vVhen large proportions of the public express an opin-
ion favorable to proposed regulations that are considered essential 
to organization for a total war, we may infer that this indicates a 
conviction that they feel competent to cope with the future and lo 
conform to rules that the government formulates as a means to 
achieve the goal of winning the war. Thus we conclude that the re-
sults of these polls are an indication of good civilian morale. 
As to the second question about poll responses as valid and re-
lia hie inclica tors of what public opinion really is. the most objective 
lL'St. is of course, that which finds subsequent behavior consistent 
with earlier expressions of opinion. In advance of that test all that 
can be said is to raise technical points about the selection of the ques-
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tions, the manner in which they are worded, the adequacy of the 
sample interviewed, and the methods of inteviewing. Since Blanken-
ship 8 has recently discussed the facts and principles of experimental 
tests of these questions, I shall merely cite in summary of this point 
that his conclusion from a survey of the critical literature substan-
tiates the general validity and reliability of the Gallup Polls. This 
is not, however, to ignore the fact that these polls have certain limi-
tations. The important thing to remember, it seems to me, is that no 
totalitarian state would dare to use this free· poll method of sound-
ing out public opinion. The fact that the present poll technique has 
certain imperfections and could be misused, is no more a condemna-
tion of its careful use, than it would be to say that we shall destroy 
all automobiles because some careless persons use them reck-
lessly and injure and kill innocent persons. Any· complex invention, 
whether it be a mechanical invention like the automobile, or a social 
invention like the Gallup Poll, can be misused and can endanger 
ordinary living habits. 
DISCUSSION OF DR. CHAPIN'S PAPER 
ivIARY C. lVfoADI, 
Colle_qe of St. Teresa 
As Doctor Chapin in his paper on the "Measurement of National ' 
Mo1·ale" has stated, "Morale has come to be a factor of prime im-
portance in organization for a total war." This thought is constantly' 
being brought before our attention in our daily papers, our fiction 
and our general discussions. In fact it has as a word been reiterated 
so often that people in all walks of life are beginning to be con-
sciou~ of the vagueness of the word and are striving to find its true 
rneanmg. 
In earlier wars as Doctor Chapin says, "The civilian population 
remained an inactive mass." Our. concern about morale was then 
chiefly with the attitudes of the fighting forc~s. Now however, we 
must concern ourselves with the attitudes of .the civilian forces be-
cause this present conflict has reached down into the daily lives of 
the mass of humanity and morale takes on a more individual aspect. 
Morale must then be considered as an individual attitude and in 
this guise I believe that "morale is the faith which an individual 
possesses because of his dignity as a human being, that he has value 
and a definite place in the world." It then follows that if this is the 
morale of the individual, the morale of the mass or of groups might 
likewise be interpreted to be the faith inherent in human societies 
be they, folk tribes, city states, nations or world organizations. They 
must exist for a definite purpose and they must continue to exist if 
they are to attain this encl. This human dignity which the individual 
and the, mass possess is a gift of the all-powerful Goel, who ";atches 
• Blankenship, A. B., "The Opinion Polls Again!" Sociometry, V, 1. February, 
HJ42. 8!!-101; also Ross Stegner's rejoinder, pp. 102-103. 
